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Public Econornis
Since Turkey rescheduled its debt, its real (>>4P  Turkey's  well-directed public expenditure
has grown 5 percent a year - compared with an  program supported the private sector through
average 1.2 percent for other high-debt coun-  key investments in infrastructure, special incen-
tries.  tives, and credit for export and investment.
How did Turkey translate the extra breathing  Turkey also inherited substantial excess
space it got from foreign financing into sus-  capacity from heavy investment made in the
tained high real growth?  1970s. This allowed for a quick improvement in
output and exports once the exchange rate was
Turkey's  financing needs for large public  aligned.
sector deficits generated high medium-term
inflation and high real interest rates.  But the  Extemal debt does not threaten Turkey's
thrust of Turkey's program was to keep savings  creditworthiness. Internal adjustment is neces-
and interest rates up and to improve export per-  sary for consistency with inflation targets, but
formance.  tighter extemal policies are both unnecessary
and potentiaUly  damaging to Turkey's growth
prospects and intemal balance.
This paper is a product of the Public Economics Division, Country Economics De-
partment.  Copies are available free from the World Bank,  1818 H  Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Ajay Chhibber, room N1O-055, extension
60102.
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Turkey  has,  alone  among  the  high-debt  countries,  managed  to  maintain
a high growth  rate after  rescheduling  its  debt.  Its  real  GNP grew  by 5% on
average since 1980.  By comparison,  countries  with recent  debt-servicing
problems, grew at only 1.2% since 19811 ,  almost  a four percentage  point
difference  on average. At the  same  time,  Turkey's  debt-output  ratio  increased
by an amount  roughly  similar  to the increase  in the debt-output  ratio  of the
high-debt  countries,  from 28%  at the end of 1980 to 56% at the end of 1986
(see  Table  1).
in fact, it is surprising  that Turkey's  debt-output  ratio  did not
increase  a great deal more than it did in the higt.-debt  countries.  As a
percentage of GNP, Turkey ran a much lower non-interest  current account
surplus  than the high-debt countries did on average after their debt-crisis:
-0.25  percent  of GNP for  Turkey  over  the  period  1980-1986  versus  +2.6  percent
over 1982-1986  for the  high-debt  countries. This apparent  inconsistency  is
explained  by th.  higher  growth  rate  that  Turkey  managed  to sustain. Turkey's
debt-output  ratio  followed  a path similar  to that  of the  high-debt  countries,
not so much because  of large  trade  surpluses,  but because  of its  high output
growth  coupled  with  continued  access  to  foreign  financing.
This paper  discusses  two  issues  this  experience  raises.  One,  how did
Turkey  translate the extra breathing space continued access to foreign
financing  gave  it into  sustained  high  real  growth?  In  particular,  what  was the
1/  Turkey's  rescheduling  exercise  took place  over the  period  1978-80,  before
other debtor countries rescheduled their debt.  Hence the shift if
comparison  period. The  data  for  the  high  debt  countries  are  taken  from  the
IMF  World  Economic  Outlook,  October  1987. The  WEO refers  to this  group  as
"Countries  that  experienced  recent  debt  servicing  problems". For  brevity's
sake,  we refer  to  the  same  group  as "high-debt"  countries  in this  paper.
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Table  1  MEASURES  OF THE OVERALL DEBT BURDEN-
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Est.
Turkey:
Debt (US$ billion)  16.3  16.9  17.6  18.2  20.8  25.5  32.5  37.3
Medium/long term  13.8  14.7  15.9  16.0  17.6  20.8  25.6  28.8
Short term  2.5  2.2  1.8  2.3  3.2  4.8  6.9  8.5
Debt/GNP  28.0  28.6  32.8  35.6  41.5  47.9  55.9  57.6
Debt/exports  284.1  198.3  175.0  192.9  180.5  194.5  260.5  227.2
Current  Account
Surplus/GNP  -5.0  -2.8  -1.6  -3.4  -2.8  -1  .u  -2.6  -1.5
Non-Interest  Current
Account Surplus/GNP  -3.9  -0.8  1.2  -0.4  0.4  1 1  1.0  2.2
Countries  with Recent
Debt-Servicing  Problems:
Debt/GDP  32.5  37.6  43.7  47.6  47.6  49.1  51.3  53.9
Debt/exports  151.5  186.1  240.9  254.6  246.3  266.8  309.5  313.4
Current  Account
Surplus/GDP  -3.6  -5.9  -5.5  -2.0  -0.9  -0.5  -1.8  -1.5
Non-Interest  Current
Account Surplus/GDP  -0.5  -1.7  -0.5  2.8  4.1  4.2  2.5  2.6
Notes:  For comparability  the debt figures  reported  here for Turkey refer  to gross debt.  In the
rest  of the chapter  aet  debt  Ls  used.  See Page 4, footnote  I in the text.
The debt-export  ratio  refers  to year-end  debt to exports  of goods and services  (and
for Turkey also workers'  remittances)  during the year.
Countries with recent  debt-servicing  problems are defined as those  which incurred
external  payment  arrears  in 1985 or rescheduled  their  debt during the period from
end-1983  to ead-1986.
Source:  Undersecretariat  of Treasury and Foreign Trade,  Central  Bank and World EcoQomic
Outlook (IMF), October  1987.
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public  sector's  role in this process?  Second,  what are the prospects  for a
repeat  performance?  Can Turkey, in the years to come, reconcile  external
balance  and  sustained  output  growth?
To this end, we develop  and apply to Turkey an econometric  model
designed  to shed light  on the  public  sector's  role in the  internal  adjustment
to externel  transfer  targets.  The central  issue is, how to bring about a
private  savings  over investment  surplus  that  will reconcile  external  targets
and fiscal  deficits  without  jeopardizing  output  growth. The  analysis  focuses
on two  aspects  of fiscal  policy  that  can  contribute  to this  goal.
First,  the impact  of aggregate  fiscal  deficits  on external  balance,
and the way real interest  rates can resolve potential conflicts betweer,
targets  for the two.  Second,  the impact  of the composition  of government
expenditure  on output  growth,  in investment  of course  has a direct  impact  on
potential  output  growth  to the extent  that it adds to productive  capacity.
This  effect  could  be negated  if  public  investment,  either  directly  or through
the impact  of its  method  of financing,  would  reduce  private  investment.  This
issue  is  at the  core  of our  empirical  analysis.
In what follows  we first  present  the analytical  structure  of the
model (Sections  II.A  and II.B).  The results  of empirical  estimation  of the
behavioral equations in that model are presented in Section II.C.  This
Section first deals with the  impact  of real interest rates on private
consumption;  a  subsequent  subsection  links  private investment  to capacity
utilization,  real interest  rates,  the  volume  of credit  to the  private  sector
and variables relating to the size and composition  of public investment
expenditure.  Finally,  in Subsection  lI.C(iii),  we establish  econometrically
the link between  private  and public  investment  and the growth  rate of real
GNP.
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This  model  is then  used in Section  III  to assess  the  public  sector's
role in Turkey's  macroeconomic  achievements  since 1980. In Section  IV the
focus  is  on the  future.  We first  assess  Turkey's  leeway  on the  current  account
if creditworthiness  is to  be maintained. We use a pragmatic  approach  due  to
Daniel  Cohen (1985,1987)  to quantify  this issue.  The  model  developed  in this
paper is then used to explore  whether  sustainability  restrictions  on fiscal
-leficits  and the creditworthiness  constraints  on external  borrowing leave
enough room for satisfactory output growth.  Finally we highlight the
importance  of continued  access  to foreign  financing  by presenting  scenarios
where  such  aca.ess  is  denied.
II.  EXTERNAL  DEBT,  INVESTMENT  AND  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR
A.  Analytical  Framework
The  model  presented  here  has been  designed  to shed  light  on the  key
question  raised  in this paper: can the objectives  of external  balance and
satisfactory  output  growth  be reconciled? What is the role  of fiscal  policy
in this  trade-off? The  model  is  sharply  focused  on the  role  of fiscal  policy,
and  hence  covers  only  the  essential  relations  necessary  to explore  the  impact
of fiscal  policy  on  private  savings  and  investment  behavior,  output  growth  and
external  balance.  It is used in an analysis  of the  past in Section  III,  and
then  in Section  IV in  an exploration  of the  trade-offs  between  output  growth,
external  debt  and  real  interest  rates.
Several  channels  are  highlighted.  First  of all,  the  relation  between
interest  rates, fiscal  deficits  and external  balance.  High real interest
rates,  by depressing  private  investment  and  consumption,  create  more  room fc_
fiscal  deficits  for  any  given  external  balance  target. At the  same  time,  high
real  interest  rates  complicate  fiscal  management,  since  they  raise  the  cost  of
servicing  the  domest'c  public  debt. Crucial  parameters  are  the  sensitivity  of
private  savings  and investment  with respect  to the  real interest  rate;  these
receive  detailed  econometric  attention  in  Section  II.C.
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A  second channel  relies  not so much on the interrelation  netween
aggregate  fiscal  deficits,  real interest  rates  and the current  account,  but
more on the composition  of government  expenditure  programs.  A substantial
part of total  investment  in Turk,  s undertaken  by the  public  sector. As a
consequence,  the allocation  of gt,  ernment  expenditure  ove: consumption  and
investment is an important determinant of output growth for any given
expenditure  level.  But not all public sector investment  projects  are as
effective in promoting growth.  The model highlights,  in addition  to the
amount of public investment,  the importance  of its composition.  Section
II.C(ii)  provides  evidence  that public  investment  in manufacturing  actually
depresses  private  investment.  Thus  the  composition  of public  investment  is  an
important determinant of its impact on private investment  and hence on
aggregate  investment  and  output  growth.
Final  channels  incorporated  in the  model  are the  effect  of capacity
utilization  on  private  investment  and,  in addition  to the  impact  of investment
on output  growth,  a reverse  impact  of output  growth  on private  savings  and
investment.  These channels  have been important  in the past few years as
Section  III  demonstrates,  and  are  therefore  incorporated  in the  model.
B.  Real  Interest  Rates.  Fiscal  Policy.  Output  Growth:  the  Way  the  Model  Works
If there  is  imperfect arbitrage between foreign and domestic
interest-bearing  assets, either  because of imperfect substitutability  or
explicit capital controls,  the link between foreign  and domestic  interest
rates is severed.  External  targets  can then be maintained  even if fiscal
deficits  increase,  as interest  rate  policy  can  be used to generate  a  matching
higher net private savings surplus.  If, alternatively,  arbitrage  causes
domestic  interest  rates  to  closely  follow  foreign  interest  rates  corrected  for
exchange  rate depreciation,  macroeconomic  policy  faces much  tighter
constraints:  interest  rates  can  no longer  be used  as an  instrument.
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This has become a more important issue with the introduction  of
foreign  exchange  deposit  acccunts  (FX deposits)  at the end of 1983.  It is
clear that interest rates on FX deposits form a  floor for the level o.f
domestic  rates  on comparable  assets. Domestic  rates  below  the  rate  obtainable
on FX deposits (corrected for exchange rate depreciation)  would almost
certainly  erode  the  domestic  deposit  base  of the  banking  system  as large  scale
shifts  out  of domestic  deposits  would  take  place. However,  it  is not  so clear
that  arbitrage  works in the  other  direction  too.  The time  period  since  the
introduction  of FX deposits  is too short to allow for formal  econometric
tests,  but the  volume  of FX deposits  would  seem too small  to force  domestic
interest rates down by massive shifts  into domesUic  assets  out of the FX
deposits  if  any  positive  interest  rate  differential  arises.
Figure  1 shows  that  domestic  interest  rates  in  Turkey  have  not been
closely tied to foreign interest  rates adjusted for depreciation  of the
exchange  rate.  The figure  compares  the  nominal  interest  rate  on 6 month  time
deposits  with the  nominal  rate  of interest  on similar  instruments  in the  USA.
The latter  are  brought  on a comparable  basis  by correcting  them  for the  rate
at which the TL actually  depreciated  against  the US dollar  over the period
covered  by the iLiterest  rates. 2 The figure  shows  that  the  rise in interest
iates in 1985 and 1986 was well in excess  of what can be explained  from
changes  in foreign  interest  rates (after  exchange  rate  correction). In fact
the foreign  rates  corrected  for depreciation  fell significantly  below their
1980-1984  average  in 1985  and  1986 (see  Figure  1A).  The discrepancy  is even
2/  The  domestic  equivalent  of  a foreign  interest  rate  i*  thus  becomes:
[(l+it*)Et+l/Etl  - 1
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more pronounced  when lending  ratss  are used as a basis for comparison  (see
Figure  1B). This  is  not  surprising,  since  there  is  no arbitrage  to narrow  the
gap between foreign and domestic lending rates. There is no competition
between foreign  and domestic  banks in Turkey for business  loans;  domestic
banks  enjoy  what  amounts  to  a  monopoly  pos'tion.
As long  as domestic  interest  rates  are  not  linked  to foreign  interest
rates  (i.e. foreign rates plus exchange rate depreciation)  there is an
additional degree of freedom in macroeconomic  policy.  Then ci'  es in
domestic real interest  rates can resolve potential discrepancies  between'
fiscal  deficits  and external  targets  through  their  impact  on the  r.et  private
savings  surplus. 3 In the  process,  private  investment  and  hence  output  growth
will  be affected. This is an important  link  between  fiscal  policy  and  output
growth.
The  mechanism  of this  link  between  fiscal  policy  and  output  growth  is
shown  in Figure  2.  Underlying  this  figure  is the  following  identity,  derived
from the national  accounts,  but with behavioral  content  built into private
savings  and investment:
(1)  CAS - FS + NPS(r)
- FS  + Spr(r) - Ipr(r)
i/  Changes in deficits  will only : '%aire  changes  in real interest  rates to
induce private  savings surplus  if private  savings would  not  rise
automatically  in response  to tax  cuts.  Such  an automatic  offset  may take
place if the private sector recognized  that a cut in taxes  without a
matching  cut in expenditure  simply  raises  the taxes  they  will  need to pay
in the  future. Then  a tax  cut  would  have  no impact  on  private  consumption.
Thus deficits  would have a one-for-one  impact  on private  savings  and no
impact  on either  real  interest  rates  or  external  balance. This is  known  as
"debt neutrality"  in the economic  literature. Empirical  tests strongly
reject  this  assumption  of "debt  neutrality"  for  Turkey.
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The private  sector's  surplus  of savings  over investment,  NPS-Spr  - Ipr. is
shown  as  a function  of the  real  rate  of interest. A higher  real  interest  rate
will slow down  private  sector  investment  and increase  private  savings,  thus
increasing  NPS.  Empirical  evidence  on these  effects  is presented  in Section
II.C.  This is represented  by the  upward  sloping  line "NPS"  in Figure  2.  The
external  deficit  that is compatible  with given  real interest  rates  (FCA for
reasible  current  account)  is  then  represented  by the  sum  of NPS  and the  fiscal
surplus  (FS;  this equals  minus the deficit).  The  horizontal  line  TCA is the
target  value for the current  account.  The real interest  rate at which the
current  account  target  TCA  equals  the  feasible  current  account  FCA  is the  real
rate  at  which  fiscal  policy  and  current  account  targets  are  in line.
An increase  in fiscal  deficits  represents  a decline  in the fiscal
surplus  and  hence  a downward  shift  in the feasible  current  accoutit  line  FCA.
To  still meet the same current  account  target,  a higher interest  rate is
needed to call forth the required  extra surpltts  of private savings  over
private  investment  (r shifts  from  rA to rB).  A cut in fiscal  deficits  will
thus allow lower  real interest  rates  for given  current  account  targets,  and
hence  higher  private  investment.
W%ether  real  interest  rates  are  indeed  endogenously  determined  out  of
the  interplay between external balance constraints,  fiscal deficits and
private (net) savings behavior, or whether consistency is achieved  by
administered  setting  of interest  rates,  or, for that matter,  by arbitrage
between  foreign  and domestic  interest  rates,  is an issue  we do not need to
address here. What matters is that (ecoaometrically  verified) relations
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between  private  savings  and investment  behavior  and  real interest  rates  imply
a restriction  on the fiscal  deficit-current  account  target  combinations  that
are possible  for any given  real interest  rate;  alternatively,  it implies  *a
restriction  on fiscal  policy  if  current  account  targets  are  to  be met  without
maintaining  real interest rates above those prevailing at world markets
(corrected  for  real  depreciation  of the  Turkish  Lira).
The analysis  so far is not enough  to tie the link between fiscal
deficits and output growth.  It has focused  on the impact  of the fiscal
deficit on private investment;  output  growth  depends  on total investment,
however,  not just on private  investment. Clearly,  the impact  of changes  in
fiscal  deficits  on output  growth  depends  on  whether  the  underlying  adjustment
is made out of public  investment  or out of public  consumption. The model
therefore  distinguishes  between  public consumption  and investment.|  Output
growth  depends  on the  sum  of  public  and  private  investment,  a relation  that  is
verified  econometrically  below  (Section  III.C(iii)):
(2)  log(y) - log(y(-l))  - fct((Ig+Ipr(r))/y).
For given  public  sector  investment  and  fiscal  deficit,  equations  (1)
and (2)  yield a negative  link  between  output  growth  and improvements  on the
current  account  of the  balance  of  payments. This  can  also  be read  from  Figure
2.  In the  bottom  quadrant,  we represent  graphically  the  relation  summarized
in equation  (2).  The top  quadrants  shows  how  higher  real interest  rates  are
necessary for a current  account improvement  for given fiscal  deficit;  the
bottom quadrant  then shows how these  higher real interest  rates slow down
output growth through their impact  on private investment.  This conflict
between  external  balance  and output  growth  is of course  at the core of the
macroeconomic  problems  caused  by the  debt  crisis.
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C.  Agolication  to  Turkey:  Empirical  Preliminaries
This Section presents the estimation of the parameters in the
behavioral  equations  of the model.  We first  present  a private  consumption
function. The next subsection  shows  the  results  for an investment  function
linking  private  fixed  capital  formation  to  capacity  utilization,  real  interest
rates  and  output. Finally  we give ,  and  a growth  equation  linking  total  fixed
capital  formation  and  real  GNP  growth  investment.
(i)  Private  Consumption
Private  consumption  (CONKP,  nominal  cGnsumption  deflated  by the  CPI)
depends  on the  real interest  rate,  the  real  exchange  rate,  inflation,  current
income,  and  a proxy  for  wealth  ("permanent  income"). The real interest  rate
used is defined  as the  highest  (compound)  interest  rate  on time  depLsits,  net
of taxes,  and converted  into  a real  rate  using  CPI inflation. The inflation
term  is  CPI inflation.
Permanent  income  (a  proxy  for  wealth)  is  approximated  by trend  growth
in  private  disposable  income. This  trend  is  calculated  by a regression  of the
logarithm  of private  disposable  income  on time,  a constant,  and a dummy to
distinguish  the  period  before  and after  1978.  The dummy  variable  takes  the
value  zero  before  1978  and  one from  1978  onwards. It captures  a level  shift
in the time  path of real income  associated  with the severe  downturn  in 1978.
Output  growth  has  since  recovered  to roughly similar  growth  rates  as the  ones
that  characterized  the  pre-1978  period. Clearly,  no catch-up  has taken  place
with what output  would have been if the 1978 downturn  would  not have taken
place.
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We therefore  modeled  the  shift  as a break in the  level  of income  rather  than
in the coefficient  of the time trend.  The results  of this regression  are
summarized  in  equ. (3):
(3)  log(PERYP) - 4.47 + .058  TIME - 0.10 DUMMY
(16.4)  (13.5)  (2.01)
2  - 0.97, D.W.-0.47
Temporary  income  TMPYP  is  defined  as the  excess  of actual  income  over  trend:
TMPYP  - YP/PERYP
YP is  actt'al  disposable  income,  and  PERYP  the  permanent  component.
With these data definitions,  the private consumption regression
yields  the  following  estimates:
(4)  log(CONKP) - -1.54 - 0.82 LOG(l + RDEP) - 0.77 CPIinf
(1.92)  (2.12)  (2.37)
+ 1.35  log(PERYP)  - 0.19  log(TMPYP)
(7.91)  (0.32)
R2 - 0.96, DW - 1.72, Sample Period 1970-1986,  TSLS
The  impact of the real after-tax deposit rate RDEP on private
consumption  is negative, and  significantly so.  In addition, private
consumption  depends  negatively  on inflation,  with  an almost  equal  coefficient.
This  has  also  been found  in  consumption  analysis  for  some  developed  countries:
in particular  see Bean (1986)  for similar  evidence  on the UK.  Finally,  the
effect  of permanent  income  on consumption  is strongly  positive,  as expected,
with a coefficient  close  to one.  The coefficient  on temporary  income  'q low
and insignificant  (a t-statistic  of only  0.32;  significance  requires  a value
of 2 or  more). All these  results  fit  in  well  with accepted  theory  of consumer
behavior.
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(ii) Private  Investment
The investment  equation  is  based  on an eclectic  "accelerator"  model.
Private  fixed  capital  formation  (ie  investment  net  of stock  changes)  depends,
first  of all, anticipated  future  sales,  proxied  here  by lagged  output  (Y(-l);
clearly  data  on current  output  are  not  available  when  investment  decisions  are
taken). In addition,  the  real  after-tax  lending  rate (RLEND),  converted  into
a real rate  using the GNP deflator,  is used to capture  the cost of funds. 4
However  prevalence  of credit rationing and the use of credit subsidies
suggest  that  quantities,  in  addition  to  prices,  are  likely  to  be important.
This effect  was captured,  in an admittedly  crude  way, by including  the ratio
of credit to the private sector over output (CRD/Y) as an explanatory
variable.  In addition,  capacity  utilization  in manufacturing  (CPUTL)  was
included  as a proxy  of the  ratio  between  expected  sales  and  output  capacity.
The final  explanatory  variable  is less  conventional. The (lagged)  share  of
infrastructure  investment  in  total  public  investment,  SHINF,  is included  in  an
attempt to assess the impact  of allocation  of public  sector  investment  on
private  investment.  The  econometric  results  are  remarkably  good:
(5)  log(INFKP)  - - 15.68 + 1.24 log(CRD/Y)
(4.20) (2.52)
+ 1.21 log(Y(-l)) - 1.69 log(l  + LREND)
(6.49) (4.17)
+ 1.45  log(CPUTL)  + 0.35  log(SHINF(-3))
(1.40)  (1.15)
R2 - 0.79,  DW - 1.66,  Sample  Period  1970-1986,  TSLS
g/ See Chhibber  and van Wijnbergen  (1988)  for documentation  of the interest
rates  and  various  tax  wedges  that  have  been incorporated  in the  derivation
of the  lending  rate  figures,  as well  as for the  theoretical  basis  and  data
to estimate  the  private  investment  equation.
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The regression  results  show that both the quantity  and the cost of
credit have  a strong and significant impact on private sector capital
formation.  The real after-tax lending rate has a negative sign and is
significantly  different  from zero:  the t-statistic  equals  4.17.  The credit
variable  too is highly significant. The precision  of the coefficients  on
capacity  utilization  and on the share  of infrastructure  investment  in total
public  sector  investment  is  low,  although  they  have  the  right  sign.
(iii) Investment  and  Output  Growth
The relation  between investment  and output growth is based on a
simple  production  function  approach. First,  a measure  of capacity  output  was
derived  by combining  actual  real  GNP  with the  measure  of capacity  utilization
used in the  investment  equation:
YKA  - Y/CPUTL
TIhis  is an imperfect  measure,  since  CPUTL  applies  to  manufacturing  only,  and
it is used to derive aggregate capacity, not  just capacity output in
manufacturing.  No better  measure  was available  however.  Also,  reliable  data
on labor  use  are  not available. So in the  end the  equation  estimated  simply
links  capacity  output  to last  period's  capacity  output  and  the  share  of total
fixed  capital  formation  in  GNP:
(6a)  log(YKA) - 0.016 + 0.45 (INFT(-l)/Y(-l)
(0.20) (1.20)
+ 0.94  log(YKA(-l))
(28.3)
R2 - 0.98, DW - 1.67, Sample Period 1970-1986,  OLS
This can be rewritten  to yield  an expression  linking  investment  shares  with
the  rate  of  output  growth:
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(6b)  log(YKA) - log(YKA(-l) -
0.016  + 0.45 (INFT(-l)/Y(-l))
(0.20) (1.20)
- 0.06  log(YKA(-l))
(1.70)
In the actual model used for the simulations,  (6b) was used, with the
coefficient  for  log(YKA(-l)  on the  right-hand-side  set  equal  to  zero.
III. FISCAL  POLICY,  PRIVATE  SAVINGS  AND INVESTMENT  AND  OUTPUT  GROWTH
A.  Th  Lole  of Fiscal  Policy:  an  Outline
The introduction  argued that Turkey  has adopted  a growth-oriented
debt  strategy  rather  than  rely  on sustained  high  surpluses  on the  non-interest
current account to keep the debt-output  ratio in check.  The key factor
determining  success  or failure  of such a strategy  is an internal  adjustment
program  that relies  sufficiently  on reduced  consumption  rather  than reduced
investment  to generate  the  internal  surplus  that  is required. If  consumption
does not fall, either external targets or output  growth  will need to be
sacrificed;  the  former  if investment  is not reduced  and the latter  if it is.
In this section,  it is shown  how Turkey  has by and large  succeeded  in doing
so, and  how fiscal  policy  has contributed  to this  achievement. However,  the
analysis  also brings  out that continued  success  of this strategy  is being
jeopardized  by a deterioration  in  fiscal  deficits  and the  ensuing  reliance  on
the  issue  of high  cost  internal  debt.
Any  internal  adjustment  program designed to complement external
balance targets  has two components.  The first issue  concerns  the extent  to
which the external  transfer  will be matched  by a reduction  in the fiscal
deficit  rather  than an increase  in the private  sector  savings  surplus.  The
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second step focuses on the specific  manner in which the matching  private
sector  surplus  is brought  about,  and is the subject  of this section.  It is
here that the interaction  between private sector savings and investment
decisions  and fiscal  policy  becomes  important. The way consistency  between
internal  policies  and external  targets  is brought  about determines  whether
fiscal  plans  and  external  targets  can  both  be met  without  jeopardizing  output
growth:  does the  private  sector  run a surplus  at high levels  of savings  and
investment  or at low  levels? If the  surplus  is achieved  by increasing  savings
for  sustained  ir.vestment  levels,  output  growth  can  be maintained. If  however
the adjustment comes mostly out of investment  cutbacks  for given private
savings rates, external  adjustment  is bought at the cost of lower output
growth.
An obvious  part of the solution  is to shift  government  expenditure
away from  consumption  towards  investment. Table  2 shows  the  extent  to which
this  was  achieved  in  Turkey. As a consequence,  the  public  sector  savings  rate
(revenue  minus current expenditure  as a percentage  of revenue)  increased
substantially  over  the  period,  in  fact  to levels  not reached  at any  time  since
1967 (see  Figure  3).  However,  not  much is gained  by such a strategy  if,  in
the end, additional  public  sector  investment  simply  substitutes  for reduced
private sector investment.  This was probably  avoided in Turkey; private
investment  did not decline as a share of GNP between 1981 and 1985,  and
actually  increased  after  that (Table  2).5  It is  now in fact  slightly  higher
than  the  level  it  reached  during  the  period  1972-1980.
..  Although  almost  the entire  increase was  due  to  increased housing
investment.
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Finally,  it is possible  that government  consumption  cannot  be cut
sufficiently  to make room for public  sector  investment  and still  reduce  the
fiscal  deficit  sufficiently  to effect  the external  transfer. Table  2 shows
that government  consumption  was reduced  substantially  from 12.3 percent in
1980 to 8.4 percent in 1985 and 8.8 percent in 1986; but public sector
investment rose by almost the same amount.  If, in that case, private
investment  should  not suffer,  sufficient  private  savings  need to  be generated
to complete the internal adjustment effort.  Section 3.3 analyzes the
determinants  of private  saving  and  shows  how interest  rate  policy  has  at least
partially succeeded in restraining  private consumption to the necessary
extent. However,  if interest  rate  policy  is  used to  stimulate  private  saving,
private investment  will be reduced;  hence the need to complement  such a
strategy with measures to promote private investment  to ensure that the
adjustment  effort  comes  mostly  out  of private  consumption  rather  than  out of
private  investment.
This  section  focuses  on the  role  that  fiscal  policy  and  real  interest
rates  have played  in  bringing  about  these  developments.  First,  fiscal  policy
may exert  a direct  influence  on the  net  private  savings  surplus 6 through  real
interest  rate-based  crowding-out.  The  overall  fiscal  deficit  is important  for
this  channel. A second  linkage  between  fiscal  policy  and  private  savings  and
investment  occurs through  the composition  of government  expenditure  rather
than through  the size of the deficit. A third  channel  involves  neither  the
overall  deficit  nor the  composition  of  government  expenditure,  but the  way the
ceficit is financed.  Monetization,  inflation  and more in general  credit
policy  all  influence  private  savings  and  investment  behavior.
§/ Net  private  savings  is  private  savings  net  of  private  investment.
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In Turkey,  fiscal  deficits  and  the  deficit  on current  account  of the
balance  of  payments  have  more  or less  moved  in tandem  during  most  of the  1970s
and 1980s.  This pattern was broken in 1986-1987,  however, when fiscal
deficits  deteriorated,  but the  current  account  deficit  improved. At the  same
time,  real  interest  rates  went  up significantly.  This  suggests  that  high real
interest  rates  were necessary  to induce  a  higher  net  private  savings  surplus;
this prevented  the increase  in fiscal  deficits  from spilling  over into the
current  account. The importance  of this  mechanism  for  Turkey  is  demonstrated
below.
However, several recent developments  do not fit easily in this
explanation. If high real interest  rates  created  the  room for  higher  fiscal
deficits  without a matching  current  account  deterioration,  how was Turkish
output  growth  so  high?  High  real  interest  rates  presumably  slow  down  at least
private  investment,  thus  slowing  down output  growth. To understand  why this
did  not  happen  in  Turkey,  one  needs  to  analyze  more  closely  various  mechanisms
other  than  real interest  rates  and the size  of fiscal  deficits  through  which
fiscal  policy  influences  private  investment.
A  second  channel  through  which fiscal  policy  influences  the private
sector  depends  not so much on the fiscal  deficit,  but on the composition  of
expenditure. Government  investment  itself  results  in capital  accumulation.
So negative output effects  of fiscal  deficits  through  real interest-based
crowding-out  of private  investment  can  be offset  to some extent  by shifting
the  composition  of government  expenditure  away  from  consumption  to investment.
In addition to this direct substitution  effect there is a more
indirect  channel through which the composition  of government  expenditure
influences private investment.  Public sector investment,  especially in
infrastructure,  often stimulates  rather than replaces  private investment
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expenditure. Public  sector  investment  in, say, roads  will make investment
more attraccive for the private sector in places that were inaccessible
before.  Section  II.C(ii)  demonstrated  that  this link  is  important
empirically. This channel  is a reason  why private  sector  investment  has in
fact  not suffered  that  much from the  continued  high real interest  rates  over
the  past five  years.
B.  Fiscal  Policy  and  Capital  Accumulation:  Crowding-Out  or Crowding-In?
Aggregate investment  has recovered from the sharp cutbacks  made
during  the  macroeconomic  turmoil  of the  1978-1980  period. The share  of total
fixed investment  in GNP is currently  (1986-1987)  5.8  percentage  points  above
the  average  over  the  five  year  period  between  1967  and  1971.
By far the largest  part of the increase  in investment  is due to
higher  public  sector  investment  (see  Figure  4).  The ratio  of public  sector
capital  expenditure  to GNP increased  from 11 percent  to 14 percent  between
1980  and  1987. This  shift  in  government  expenditure  towards  investment  is the
main explanation  of why output  growth  has not suffered  from the mismatch
between fiscal deficits and external targets  and the resulting  high real
interest  rates.
Private  fixed investment,  while increasing  from the low point (7.2
percent  of GNP) reached  in 1981,  has not recovered  significantly  beyond  the
levels  reached  in the  early  1970s.
Empirical  analysis  shows  that  the  high real  Interest  rates  have been
an important factor behind  the somewhat  lacklustre  performance  of private
sector  investment. 7
j/ The  various  channels  through  which  public  policy  affects  private  investment
are  explained  more  fully  in  Chhibber  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1988).
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Several  factors  have  worked  against  this  negative  impact  of  high real
interest  rates,  and  explain  why  private  investment  has in fact  been rising  at
all  over the  past five  or six  years.  First,  the  Government  has consistently
provided  generous  investment  incentives  over  this  period. Second,  except  for
1984,  the  growth  rate of  credit  extended  to  the private sector has
consistently  exceeded the  rate of output growth, in most years by a
substantial  margin.  Third,  capacity  utilization  increased  over this  period.
The final  factor  is  more directly  related  to fiscal  policy. At issue  is the
composition  of public  investment.  Since  1980,  the  Government  has shifted  the
composition  of its public  sector  investment  program  heavily  towards  sectors
where  it  complements  rather  than  competes  with  private  sector  investment.
A counterfactural  analysis  of private investment  (see  Chhibber  and
van Wijnbergen  1988)  that the  negative  impact  of the  high rates  of interest
dominated  early  on,  but that  their  negative  impact  was  gradually  offset  by the
other measures discussed.  From 1984 onwards,  the impact  of the positive
measures  more than offset  the negative  impact  of real interest  rates.  By
1986,  the  net  positive  impact  of the  measures  mentioned  exceeded  the  negative
impact  of the high real interest  rates  by a full percentage  point of GNP.
This analysis  therefore  supports  the  view that the overall  impact  of fiscal
policy and improved capacity  utilization  on private investment  has been
positive,  the  high real  lending  rates  notwithstanding.
C.  Real Interest  Rates.  Income  Grcwth  and  Private  Savings
Public investment increased substantially,  while other measures
helped  to avoid  the potential  negative  impact  on private  investment  over the
1980-1987  period.  At the same time, fiscal  deficits  deteriorated,  but the
deficit  on the  current  account  of the  balance  of payments  was in fact  reduced
as a percentage  of GNP.  What made these  apparently  disparate  developments
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consistent  was a substantial  increase  in private  savings  over the 1980-1987
period.  Private  saving  reached  a low  point in 1983  at 5.9 percent  of GNP,
down from  7.8  percent  in 1980;  but it  has  been improving  since  1985,  to reach
11  percent  in 1987 (see  Figure  4).  This section  explores  some  of the  reasons
behind  this  improved  savings  performance  and  assesses  its  likely  continuation
in the  future.
Rising  real rates  of interest  have  been a major  contributing  factor
to the increase  in private  savings. The after-tax  real rate of interest  on
one-year  time  deposits  has  risen  from  -3.5  percent  in 1980  to  almost  6  percent
in 1984,  and  up tn  about  13  percent  in 1987  (see  Figure  5).
The sharp dise  in interest  rates  since  1985 explains  a substantial
part of the  even  sharper  rise  in  the  private  savings  rate  that  has  taken  place
since  1985.  The econometric  results  summarized  in Section  II suggest  that  a
2.5 percentage point rise in the real interest rate increases NPS by 1
percentage  point  of GNP.  Without  the increase  in real rates  that took  place
since 1985, the econometric  analysis  suggests  that savings  would have been
lower  by around  0.8  percent  of GNP in 1985  and  by almost  2 percentage  points
of GNP  by the  end  of 1986.
While  interest  rate  developments  explain  much  of the  improved  savings
performance,  the  rise  in savings  since  1985  cannot  be fully  attributed  to  the
increase in real interest rates that also took place since then.  The
econometric  analysis  suggests  that  of the 5 percentage  points  increase  since
1985,  only 2 percentage  points  can  be attributed  to the  simultaneous  rise  in
the  real  rate  of interest.
Another  important  factor,  especially  in the  past  couple  of  years,  may
be  that the higher than average growth in the economy and in private
disposable income is perceived as only a temporary increase in income.
Section  II.C(ii)  shows  that  the  propensity  to consume  out of temporary  income
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is negligible.  The perception that -an  increase  in disposable  income  is
temporary,  rather  than permanent,  would therefore  havA a smaller  effect  on
consumption,  or alternatively,  a larger  effect  on savings. This factor  alone
would  account  for an increase  in the savings  of about  1.5 - 2.0 percentage
points  in 1986  and  1987.
This explanation  has important  implications  for what is likely  to
happen over the next few years.  A  decline  in private savings  should  be
expected  once output growth  returns  to a more sustainable  5 or 6 percent.
This would effectively  make it much more difficult  to continue  the current
level  of fiscal  deficits  without  once again  increasing  external  imbalances.
Reducing  fiscal  deficits,  however,  could  have severe  costs for  output  growth
unless the cutbacks are properly designed.  The trade-off  involved  is the
subject  of the  next  Section.
D.  Fiscal  Deficits.  Interest  Rates  and  Growth
Large fiscal deficits have not prevented a satisfactory  current
account performance.  The price for this has been the need to maintain
increasingly  high real rates  of interest. The empirical  analysis  presented
shows that in Turkey such a policy is effective  by restraining  private
consumption, and, to a  lesser extent, private investment expenditure.
Deleterious  effects on output growth have until now been avoided.  The
analysis  in  the  preceding  sections  identified  high  public  sector  investment  as
the  most important  explanation  of why output  growth  did not slow  down.  This
section  uses the  econometric  model  of section  II to  quantify  this  link.
Figure 6  shows the results of simulation runs made with  that
econometric  model.  Interest rates were varied,  but fiscal  deficits  were
adjusted so as to maintain external  balance targets.  First, the fiscal
cutbacks  necessary  to sustain  external  balance  as interest  rates  are lowered
were assumed  to come entirely  from government  consumption.  Public  sector
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investment  remains constant  by assumption.  The figure  shows that a five
percentage  cut in interest  rates  will cause  a  drop in the  private  sector's
surplus  of savings  over  investment  of 2.1  percentage  points  of  GNP (see  Figure
6A,  upper  right). 8 A substantial  part  of the  decline  in net  private  savings
comes  from  increased  investment  by the  private  sector  in  response  to the  lower
real  interest  rates. Since  public  sector  investment  was fixed  by assumption,
output  growth  goes  up,  by 0.5  percentage  point  of GNP  on average  over  the  five
year period the model was run (see Figure 6A, upper left; the base run
simulates  the  period  between  1981  and  1986).
The  results  are  very different  when the  fiscal  cutbacks  are  assumed,
perhaps  more realistically,  to come  also  from  public  sector  investment  rather
than  from  consumption. Assuming  that  all  government  expenditure  would  be cut
back proportionally  implies  that 60 percent  of the  cut comes  from  reductions
in the public sector's  investment  program.  The results  are summarized  in
Figure  lOB.  Now  while  the  lower  interest  rates  stimulate  private  investment,
the cut in public sector  investment  more than offsets this: as a result,
output  growth  actually  declines  by an average  0.5  percentage  point  of GNP  over
the five year simulation  period.  Shifting  from no cut in public sector
investment  to letting  60  percent  of the  fiscal  adjustment  come  out  of cutbacks
in public investment  therefore  causes  a full percentage  point drop in GNP
growth  for  the  five  years  over  which  the  model  was  run.
B/  In the run, the spread  between  lending  rates  and deposit  rates  was kept
constant. A five  percentage  points  cut  in the  borrowing  rate  thus  implies
a five  percentage  points  cut in  the  lending  rate  too.
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There  is,  moreover, a  vicious  circle  aspect  to  this policy
experiment. Cutting  public  sector  investment  reduces  output  growth,  which  in
turn will lead to less of a private sector's savings surplus.  As a
consequence,  fiscal  deficits  and  hence  public  sector  investment  need to  be cut
further  to  maintain  external  balance,  growth  slows  down  more  and so on.  As a
result,  a five  percentage  points  cutback  in real  interest  rates  requires  a cut
in the  fiscal  deficit  of 2.1  percentage  points  of GNP if external  balance  is
to be maintained  through  reduced  government  consumption. However,  with 60
percent  of the  cuts  coming  from  public  sector  investment,  deficits  need to  be
reduced  by 2.8  percentage  points  of GNP, a full 0.7  percentage  point  of GNP
more.
The analysis  also  suggests  that there  is  some threshold  at  which  the
fall in public  sector  investment  would just offset  the increase  in private
investment  triggered  by lower  real rates.  If only 28 percent  of the  cut in
government  expenditure  falls  on public  sector  investment,  the model  results
suggest that output growth will not be affected.  A  caveat  concerns  the
medium-term  nature  of this  model;  a short  run recession  triggered  by such a
fiscal  retrenchment  could  still  lower  output.
The arguments  presented  here do not imply  a blanket  endorsement  of
ever increasing  public  sector  investment;  public  sector  investment  of course
does come at a cost. 9 They do highlight,  however, that public  sector
investment  has  played  an important  role in  Turkey's  strong  growth  performance
over the last few years.  Moreover,  they show that stabilization  programs
%/ Other expenditure components  need to be cut or alternative  means of
financing  need  to  be found;  each  carries  its  own  cost.
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relying  on reductions  in  public  sector  investment  will  have  high  and  permanent
negative  output  effects  through  the mechanisms  demonstrated. These are in
addition  to any  output  effects  that may  arise because  of  short-run
macroeconomic  problems,  which  are  not  covered  here.
IV.  OUTPUT  GROWTH  AND  EXTERNAL  BALANCE:  CAN  THEY  BE RECONCILED?
A.  Looking  Ahead:  External  Constraints.  Fiscal  Consistency  and  the  Prospects
for  Sustainable  Growth
The main issue  now is,  of course,  can the successful  performance  of
the  past six  years  be repeated  in  the  future? Can  Turkey  sustain  a reasonable
growth  rate within  the limits  set by creditworthiness  constraints? If so,
what  should  the  public  sector  do to  bring  this  about?
To answer  this question,  one first  needs  to have some idea  of what
exactly  these  creditworthiness  constraints  imply. How  much can  Turkey  borrow
without bringing its creditworthiness  in jeopardy?  The answer  naturally
depends  on the target  real growth  rate in Turkey  itself  and on anticipated
growth  rates  in trading  partners;  an approach  to ouarntify  all these  factors
has been developed  by Daniel  Cohen (1985,  1987)  and is applied  to Turkey  in
Section  IV.B.
Once the feasible  current  account  deficit  has been decided  upon,  a
matching internal adjustment program needs to be set up.  An internal
adjustment  program  consists  of a set of policies  that will bring about a
fiscal  deficit  and a private  savings  surplus  over investment  just enough  to
match the external  current  account  target. The challenge  is to design  this
package  in such  a  way that  total  investment,  private  and  public,  will  be high
enough  to allow  output  to  grow  at its  target  rate. This involves  once  again  a
two stage  design. First  how  much should  the  public  sector  contribute  to the
required  improvement  in  the  surplus  of  aggregate  savings  over  investment?  The
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issue  here simply  is,  how  much should  the  fiscal  deficit  be cut  back.  Rather
than digress  in esoteric  discussions  about  optimal  government  borrowing,  we
take a more modest  approach.  We use a quantitative  framework  designed  to
answer the question: how big a fiscal deficit can the government  afford
without  jeopardizing  other  macroeconomic  targets? This  is covered  in Section
IV.C.  Once this has become clear,  the difference  between the targets  for
fiscal  deficits  and external  balance  need to be made up by the private  net
savings  surplus. The issue  is  whether  this  will require  real interest  rates
so high, that reasonable  growth  targets  cannot  be achieved  anymore.  This is
the  subject  of the  remaining  part  of the  paper,  Section  IV.D.
B.  Exports.  Output  Growth  and  External  Borrowing
(i)  Solvency,  Creditworthiness  and  Foreign  Debt
Assessing a country's room for external borrowing involves two
considerations:  solvency  and creditworthiness.  Solvency  concerns  ability  to
pay and is intricately  linked to the non-interest  current account, real
interest  and  output  growth  rates,  and,  finally,  the  initial  level  of debt. To
remain  solvent,  a country  should  not  plan  expenditures  higher  than its  current
and  future  income  (discounted)  minus  its initial  debt.  This implies  that  the
non-interest  current  account  surplus  should  at least  equal the initial  debt
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times the difference  between  the real interest  cost of foreign  debt and the
real  output  growth  rate.- 0
For most countries,  solvency  constraints  are not very restrictive.
Turkey's  ratio  of net foreign  debt to GNP equals 51 percent.  Even if the
average  real interest  rate  on its  external  debt  remains  as  high as 8  percent,
solvency  would only require  a surplus  on the  non-interest  current  account  of
one  percent  of GNP  for  a real  output  growth  rate  of 6  percent. The  assumption
in this  chapter  is an average  real  interest  on foreign  debt of 6 percent,  so
this  would  imply  a lower  limit  of zero  on the  non-interest  current  account. A
continued deficit on the non-interest current account would eventually
jeopardize  solvency  at current  levels  of interest  rates  and projected  output
growth  rates.
1Q/  The  current  discounted  value  of income  less  expense  equals  (Y-C-I)/(r*-n)
if real interest  rates  and growth  rate constant.  Y is national  income
before  foreign  interest  payments;  I aggregate  consumption  and investment
expenditure;  r* the  average  interest  rate  on foreign  debt;  and  n the  real
growth rate economy.  Y-C-I equals the non-interest  current account
surplus this expression should not fall short of the initial debt
following  must  hold:
(1)  (Y-C-I)/(r*-n)  > B*,
or
(2) NICA  >  (r*-n)B*
Expressing  NICA and B* as shares of GNP and indicating  them by case
letters  gives  the  expression  discussed  in the  text:
(3)  nica  > (r*-n)b*
Strictly  speaking,  this formula  is only  valid if output  growth  and real
interest  rate  are  likely  to  remain  roughly  constant.
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However,  solvency  is  not the  only  consideration.  Ability  to  pay  does
not necessarily  imply  willingness  to repay.  Creditworthiness  (which  depends
on lenders' assessment  of a country's  ability and willingness to repay)
therefore  often imposes  tighter  constraints  than solvency  alone.  Repayment
requires  not  only  a sufficiently  high  value  of  wealth  to  be able  to repay,  but
also the  generation  of a surplus  of traded  goods  production  over traded  goods
consumption  (net exports). This is likely  to be much more burdensome  in a
country  with most of its resources  in non-traded  goods sectors  than in an
outward-oriented  country.  But if it is more burdensome,  a country  might  be
more tempted  not to repay,  even if  solvency  requirements  are  met.  Hence  the
importance  of debt-export  ratios  in  the  assessment  of creditworthiness.
Assessing  the  precise  limits  imposed  by creditworthiness  constraints
is difficult  for  several  reasons. First  of all,  while  debt-export  ratios  are
important,  they  are  a biased  estimate  of the  ratio  of a country's  debt  to its
output  of tradable  goods.  Some  domestically  produced  tradables  are likely  to
be sold at home rather  than exported.  So the true measure  lies somewhere
between  the  debt-output  ratio  (which  also  counts  non-tradables)  and  the  debt-
export  ratio,  which  excludes  tradable  goods  produced  and sold  at home.  This
chapter  follows  an approach  pioneered  by D.  Cohen  (1985,  1987). This  approach
chooses  the  ratio in  between  the  debt-output  (D/Y)  and the  debt-export  (D/X)
ratios  in such  a way that there  are  no incentives  to overvalue  or undervalue
the  exchange  rate simply  to mechanically  improve  creditworthiness  indicators.
The  precise  way in which  this  ratio  is derived  is  presented  in Cohen (1987);
it is influenced  by the  price  elasticity  of export  demand  and output  supply.
The outcome  for  Turkey  places  a 60 percent  weight  on debt-export  ratio  and  a
40 percent  weight  on the  ratio  of debt  to  GNP.  This  construct  is referred  to
as the  debt-resource  ratio,  D/R.
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A second,  more fundamental  problem,  involves  not so much the  choice
of any particular  creditworthiness  indicator,  but how to assess  whether  the
value of the indicator  chosen  is too  high or not (high  values  indicate  low
creditworthiness).  An indicator  is too  high (creditworthiness  too  low) if  at
that  value  the  burden  of servicing  the  debt  exceeds  the  likely  penalty  on  non-
compliance  to repayment  terms.  The problem  with this definition  is that
nobody  really  knows  how  high that  penalty  is. This section  follows  Cohen  in  a
very simple  but forceful  approach  to this  issue. The cost of default  is not
known,  but if a country  has not defaulted  at the current  value  of its  debt-
resource  ratio,  that  value is,  by implication,  not yet too  high.  Otherwise
the  country  would  have defaulted  already. A cautious  borrowing  policy  than  is
a  policy  that  will  prevent  a rising  debt-resource  ratio.
One important  caveat:  it does not follow  from this analysis  that  a
borrowing  policy  designed  to  rapidly  lower  debt-resource  ratios  is  necessarily
a good  idea. While  it  is true  that  lower  debt-resource  ratios  indicate  higher
creditworthiness,  the transitional  costs  of reaching  that lower  ratio  clearly
raise the cost of servicing the existing debt.  Since creditworthiness
involves  comparing  the  cost  of default  with  the  cost  of servicing  the  current
debt, such a strategy,  which  has been imposed  on many high-debt  countries,
would  lower  rather  than  increase  current  creditworthiness.
(ii) Sustainable  Current  Account  Deficits
How much foreign  borrowing  is compatible  with  maintaining  the  debt-
resource ratio at its current value, and hence maintaining  the level  of
creditworthiness?  Since  the  debt-resource  ratio  is a  weighted  average  of the
debt-output  and the debt-export  ratio,  it will depend  on the growth  rate of
the borrowing  country  and of its trading  partners. The growth  rate  of its
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trading partners is one of the determinants  of a country's  likely  export
growth. The other  determinant  is the  elasticity  of demand  for the  borrowing
country's  exports  with  respect  to income  in  the  countries  to  which  it  exports.
Empirical  analysisll suggests  that the income  elasticity  of demand
for  Turkey's  exports  is  high:  1.6  with respect  to the  OECD  and  4 with  respect
to the  oil-exporting  countries  in  the  Gulf  region. This  results  in  a  weighted
value of 2.  Thus, if the weighted  output in Turkey's  trading  partners 12
grows  by 4 percent,  Turkey's  exports  are likely  to grow by 8 percent.  The
real exchange  rate has no impact  on the amount  of feasible  borrowing,  as a
consequence  of its  construction.
The results  are presented  in Table 3.  The table  gives the  maximum
increase  in foreign  debt that will avoid  a rising  debt-resource  ratio,  for
different  growth  rates  at  home and  abroad. The table  lists  increases  in  debt
and  hence  gives  the  feasible  current  account  deficit. The table  lists  on its
vertical  axis  various  alternative  growth  rates  for  Turkey,  ranging  from  3  to 7
percent.  On the horizontal,  top axis it lists  potential  growth  rates for
Turkey's trading partners, aggregated using their respective shares in
Turkey's  exports. The  numbers  indicate,  as expected,  that  lower  growth  rates,
whether  at  home  or abroad,  allow  for  less  debt  accumulation.  In fact  for  zero
growth rate at home and abroad, the formula indicates that no further
borrowing  is possible  (this  possibility  is outside  the range  of the table).
Raising  the  domestic  output  growth  rate  by 4 percentage  points  allows  an extra
current  account  deficit  of 1.5  percent  of GNP for  given  foreign  output  growth
11/  See  Anand  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1988)  for  documentation.
12/  Weighted  by their  share  in  Turkey's  exports.
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rate. A slump  abroad  lowers  borrowing  potential:  if  growth  in trading  partner
countries  falls from, say, 4 percent  to zero, the amount  of feasible  debt
accumulation  goes  down  by 0.3  percentage  points  of  GNP.
Table  a:  ALLOWABLE  FOREIGN  BORROWING: SUSTAINABLI  CURRENT
ACCOUNT  DEFICITS
(percent  of GNP)
Output
Growth
of  Turkey  0  1  2  3  3.5  4
3  1.12  1.21  1.29  1.38  1.42  1.46
4  1.49  1.58  1.66  1.75  1.79  1.83
5  1.87  1.95  2.04  2.12  2.17  2.21
6  2.24  2.33  2.41  2.50  2.54  2.58
7  2.61  2.70  2.78  2.87  2.91  2.95
In section  IV.D  it is argued  that  a 6 percent  output  growth  rate  is
feasible  for  Turkey  if  some  policy  adjustments  are  implemented.  Also,  the  IMF
and the World Bank project  growth  rates in the  world economy  that yield a
combined  weighted  growth  rate  for  Turkey's  trading  partners  of 3.5  percent  for
the  next five  years. The table  suggests  that  this  implies  a feasible  current
account  deficit  of 2.5 percent  of GNP for Turkey.  This is about the same
level as in 1986 (2.6 percent of GNP) and substantially  larger  than the
current  account  deficit  of 1987.  The  conse-quences  of alternative  levels  are
pursued  in Section  IV.D.
How does this "allowable"  current  account  deficit  compare  with the
solvency  constraint? At the  projected  average  real interest  rate  on foreign
debt  of 6 percent,  a current  account  deficit  of 2.5  percent  of GNP  translates
into a non-interest  current  account  surplus  of 0.5 percent of GNP at the
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current  debt-output  ratio. 13 The solvency  constraint  implied  a zero non-
interest  current  account  for  a real  interest  rate  of 6  percent,  so this  result
confirms  what was argued  before:  creditworthiness  constraints  are tighter
than  solvency  constraints.
Furthermore  it is assumed  that all the  additional  foreign  borrowing
is available  to the  public  sector. This is  probably  reasonable,  as not mucl.
foreign  borrowing  is expected  by the private  sector  other than inflows  into
the  commercial  banking  system  through  FEDs  owned  by non-residents.  These  are
in any case  probably  better  interpreted  as remittances  in disguise  and  should
possibly be counted as above-the-line  inflows  rather  than capital account
transactions.
C.  Macroeconomic  Consistency.  Foreign  Borrowing  and  the  Public  Sector  Deficit
Macroeconomic consistency requires more than keeping external
deficits  within the limits  set by solvency  and creditworthiness. Domestic
output growth, inflation targets and internal  debt management all have
implications  for the financing  of public  expenditure.  In van Wijnbergen,
Anand and Rocha (1988)  we developed  a quantitative  framework  to derive  what
these  targets  imply  for  the  size  of the  financeable  deficit. This  was  defined
as the deficit  that  does not require  more finaincing  than is compatible  with
L3! Interest  payments  (percent  of  GNP)  - r*.b*
- 6 * 0.51
- 3 (percent  of  GNP)
where  r*  - real  interest  rate  on foreign  debt;
b* - debt-output  ratio.
Therefore,  if the current  account  equals  -2.5%  of GNP, the non-interest
current  account  surplus  equals  -2.5  + 3  - 0.5%  of  GNP.
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sustainable  external  borrowing, existing  targets for inflation  and output
growth,  and  a sustainable  internal  debt  policy. 14 This Section  explores  the
sensitivity  of the outcome  of that exercise  to the assumptions  made on debt
management  and  output  growth.
In the "base  case"  derived  in the  aforementioned  paper,  a number  of
assumptions  were  made  about  what  can  roughly  be summarized  as  debt  management.
Internal  debt issue  was targeted  at maintaining  a constant  debt-output  ratio;
external  debt issue at maintaining  a constant  debt-resource  ratio,  in line
with the  analysis  of Section  IV.B;  finally,  the  assumption  of a constant  real
exchange  rate  from  1988  onwards  precluded  any  capital  losses  on foreign  debt.
All this adds up to a required deficit reduction of 1.2 percent  of GNP
compared  to the  deficit  the  government  ran  in 1986,  if  at least  a target  of 20
percent inflation is to be met. 1 5 Changes in these assumptions,  in
particular  concerning  debt  management  and  output  growth,  are  discussed  in this
Section.
(i)  Fiscal  Implications  of Debt  Management
What would  have  happened  if Turkey  had  not followed  its  policy  of a
relaxed  external  deficit  and only moderate internal debt  issue?  In
particular,  what are the fiscal  consequences  of a debt substitution  policy
j_/  A  simple version of this framework  was  first used in Anand and van
Wijnbergen  (1987).  The current version incorporates  external debt
considerations  and implications  of the financial  structure  for inflation
tax  revenues. It is  presented  in  van  Wijnbergen,  Anand  and  Rocha  (1988).
1J,  The deficit has increased  substantially  since,  by almost  4 percentage
points of GNP; consistency  with the targets  mentioned therefore  will
require  a commensurately  larger  cut  back in  fiscal  deficits.
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followed  in  many  debtor  countries? Many  of them  in  effect  paid  off  relatively
cheap external debt from revenue raised by  issuing much more expensive
domestic  debt.
Assume  that  Turkey  had  not  increased  its  external  debt  at  all  between
1980 and 1986,  other than  what was caused  by capital  losses  due to exchange
rate  depreciation,  but instead  had issued  internal  debt.  In Anand,  Chhibber,
Rocha and van Wijnbergen  (1988)  we showed  that after correction  for cross-
currerncy  exchange  rate fluctuations  and real  depreciation  of the  TL,  Turkey's
debt-output  ratio  went  up by only  13.8  percentage  points  of GNP. The rest  was
due to capital losses.  What would have happened if Turkey, instead of
increasing  its  external  debt-output  ratio  by 13.8  percent  of GNP,  had issued
an equivalent  amount  of internal  debt  instead?
First the results of a mechanical  debt swap: a once-off  sale of
domestic debt to retire an equivalent amount of external debt.  This
effectively  amounts  to a debt-buy-back  scheme. This  experiment  considers  only
the budgetary consequences  of changing one type of debt instrument  for
another. It does  not consider  the  transfer  problem  associated  with  effecting
any  transfer  of resources  to foreigners;  this  issue  is  taken  up below.
Such a scheme  becomes  problematic  when domestic  real interest  rates
are  substantially  higher  than  tha  average  real  interest  cost  of foreign  debt.
In that case the budgetary  situation  deteriorates. This would also be an
issue  in  Turkey:  over the  1988-1992  period,  real rates  at home are  projected
to be 6 percentage  points  above -e average  real  cost  of foreign  debt.  As a
consequence,  the increased  interest  burden  caused  by  such a debt swap would
raise  the  actual  fiscal  deficit  by 0.8  percent  of  GNP  in  each  subsequent  year,
and the required  deficit  reduction  for  consistency  with 20 percent  inflation
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rises to 2.1 percent  of GNP, up from 1.2 percent  of GNP in the  base case.
Alternatively,  the equilibrium  inflation  rate would jump to 85 percent  per
year,  up from  50  percent,  if  no fiscal  adjustment  would  be undertaken.
A straight  asset  swap  was, however,  not the form in  which this  debt
substitution  was implemented  in  most  high-debt  countries. In order  to  effect
the implied  transfer  to foreigners,  the government  needs to find a way to
increase  either its own surplus or the net private savings surplus  by a
matching amount.  Typically, the domestic counterpart  of the increased
external  transfer  was a gradual  increase  in domestic  debt issue,  absorbed
through an increase in the private net savings surplus.  This in turn
required  higher  real  interest  rates. Such  a strategy  would  be much  worse  from
a budgetary  point  of  view.  The  reason  is that  this  scheme  would  in fact  raise
the cost of the internal  debt  beyond  its  already  high level  and thus  worsen
the impact on the budget further.  Assume that such a debt substitution
strategy  would  be implemented  over  the  next  five  years,  the  time  horizon  taken
in  this  chapter. Since  over  that  period  real  interest  cost  of foreign  debt  is
assumed  to  equal  the  real  output  growth  rate,  the  entire  adjustment  would  need
to come out of the non-interest  current account.  To achieve  the target
reduetion  of 13.8 percentage  points of GNP over a five year period thus
requires  a substantial  positive  shift  (2.7  percent  of GNP, 13.8  divided  by 5)
in the  non-interest  current  account  in  each  year.
Inducing  an increase  in net private  savings  requires  a rise in the
real  interest  rate. The  empirical  analysis  in  Section  II  suggests  that  such  a
large  increase  requires  an increase  in  domestic  real  interest  rates  of almost
7 percentage  points.  This would not only raise  the servicing  costs of the
additional  domestic  debt created  during  such  a policy,  but also the  cost of
debt incurred  earlier  as it gets  refinanced. This is important  because  by
now  most of Turkey's  internal  debt  has  a short  maturity  (by  December  1986,  76
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percent  -f the  internal  debt  had a maturity  of one  year  or less). The impact
on the budget would be large.  To sustain  consistency  with a 20 percent
inflation  target  after such a debt substitution  policy  would now require  a
reduction  in the fiscal  deficit  of 3.6  percent  of GNP.  This is  almost  double
the  adjustment  necessary  after  a  straight  asset  swap.  The budget
deterioration  would  in fact  be so  large,  that  covering  it  through  monetization
would  no longer  be feasible.  Increased  debt issue  would  be even  worse  because
of the high  real interest  rates.  Finally, external debt would not be
available  by the  very  design  of the  scheme,  which  was to  reduce  external  debt.
A  fiscal  cutback  would  thus  be unavoidable  and  would  have to  be substantial.
This raises  the issue  of whether  output  growth  could in fact  be sustained.
This is explored further in Section  IV.D,  but the numbers presented  here
should  already  indicate  that  it is  highly  unlikely.
(ii) Fiscal  Implications  of  Different  Rates  of Output  Growth
Higher  growth  allows  more internal  debt issue,  since  the  target  is a
constant debt-output  ratio; it will also increase  demand for real money
balances  by both banks  and the  private  sector,  thus increasing  the  scope  for
revenue  from monetization  for any given inflation  rate.  Hence more growth
allows  a larger  deficit  and less  need for  fiscal  adjustment. This is at the
core  of the  conflict  between  stabilization  policy  and  growth:  if stabilization
policies  cut  output  growth,  further fiscal adjustment is needed for
macroeconomic  consistency.  This  adjustment  may,  in turn,  slow  growth  further.
Table  4 indicates  the  extent  of the  trade-off.  A four  percent  growth
target  instead  of 6 percent  reduces  financing  room by about  cne percentage
point of GNP:  for a 20 percent inflation target, the required deficit
reduction  for  consistency  with  a 20  percent  inflation  target  (RDR)  becomes  2.3
percent  of GNP at 4 percent  real  growth  instead  of 1.2  percent  at 6 percent
real  output  growth. A major  recession  brings  it out  more  starkly:  a sustained
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period of only 2 percent growth in real income  would raise the required
adjustment  necessary  for  consistency  with  a 20 percent  inflation  target  to  no
less  than 3.3  percent  of GNP.  Numbers  this large  raise  the spectre  of self-
fulfilling  prophecies:  a deficit  reduction  this severc  could  easily  validate
the  low  growth  rate  on which  it  was  premised.
Table  4:  FISCAL  IMPLICATIONS  'F  OUTPUT  GROWTH
Required  Deficit
Reduction  for  a
Output  Growth  20%  Infl.  Target




D.  External  Borrowing  and  the  Potential  for  Continued  Output  Growth
The analysis  has until  now focused  on the  revenue  the  government  can
expect from various sources  of financing  given its macroeconomic  targets.
Reducing  the fiscal  deficit  to  what is financeable  given  those  macroeconomic
targets  makes  sure that the fiscal  policy  is at least  sustainable. If this
adjustment  is made, achieving  the stated  macroeconomic  targets  will not be
jeopardized  by fiscal  crises,  high inflation  or escalating  interest  payments.
However,  it does  not  guarantee  that  those  macroeconomic  targets  can  or  will  be
achieved;  only  that  the  fiscal  deficit  is  not inconsistent  with  them. Whether
the  targets  can  be achieved  is  taken  up in this  Section.
The central  question  is whether  external  restraint  and consistency
requirements  for fiscal  deficits  leave enough room for public  and private
investment  and satisfactory  output  growth.  Can external  balance  and  output
growth be  reconciled,  or is there  an inherent  conflict  between these two
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objectives?  This Section provides projections  generated  with the models
developed  in Section  II and in van Wijnbergen,  Anand and Rocha (1988)  that
should  allow  an  answer  to this  question.
(i)  The  Base  Case:  Creditworthiness  and  Sustainable  Growth
The projections  incorporate  the restrictions  on the current  account
that creditworthiness implies (see Section IV.B).  Thus, the external
borrowing  limit  is 2.5  percent  of  GNP.  This is in fact  a more liberal  target
than the low current  account  deficit  of 1987.  Besides  more leeway  on the
external  account,  it  is  also  assumed  that  the  fiscal  corrections  necessary  for
macroeconomic  consistency  will in  fact  be implemented.  This  means  a reduction
in the fiscal  deficit  of 1.2  percent  of GNP  with respect  to 1986.  Compared
with 1987 the cut in the fiscal deficit should be substantially  larger.
Public  sector  investment  was assumed  constant  in real terms  in 1987,  and,  by
assumption,  grows  at 5  percent  in real terms  thereafter. This implies  a slow
gradual  reduction  in  the  share  of  public  sector  investment  in  GNP.
A lower  fiscal  deficit  combined  with a more liberal  current  account
target  allows  for a fall in the surplus  of private  savings  over investment.
This is  exactly  what lower  real  interest  rates  will  bring  about.  The  decline
in the  fiscal  deficit,  if implemented,  allows  a gradual  fall  in real  interest
rates  of 3 percentage  points  over the  period  1988-1992.  Private  saving  falls
from  the  high levels  achieved  in 1987  to a still  respectable  11 .8  percent  of
GNP at the end of the period.  Lower real interest  rates  also lead to an
increase in the share of private investment  in GNP, which rises by one
percentage  point  of GNP over the  period. This is just enough  to offset  the
assumed  gradual  slowdown  in the  rise  of public  sector  investment.  As a result
private investment  increases  its share in total investment  by 4 percentage
points.  The share of total capital  formation  remains  at around  20 to 21
percent  of GNP. The  most  important  result  follows  from  this:  output  growth  is
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maintained  at an average  growth  rate  of 6 percent  throughout  the  period.  This
is a respectable  growth  rate  by comparison  to the  1980-1985  average,  although
below the performance  in 1986 and 1987.  Accelerating  inflation  and falling
inventories  strongly  suggest  however,  that the average  growth  rate of almost
7.5 percent  over 1986 and 1987  was caused  by unsustainable  aggregate  demand
pressure.  Continuation  of such a high growth  rate is therefore  probably
incompatible with  stable macroeconomic performance unless much higher
investment  rates  would  bring  aggregate  supply  in  line  with  aggregate  demand.
Real interest rates on foreign debt were projected  to average 6
percent over the planning  horizon;  this implies  thac.  with a 6 percent  real
growth rate, real interest  payments  do not by themselves  lead to further
increases  in the  debt-output  ratio. As a consequence,  the  ratio  of net debt
to output  stays  roughly  constant  at around  53 percent  of GNP.  This suggests
the  main conclusion:  if fiscal  restraint  measures  are implemented  to restore
consistency  with other macroeconomic  targets,  sustained output growth is
possible  without  escalating  foreign  debt.
Four caveats  should  be stressed  at tbis point.  First  of all, the
scenario  depends  heavily  on the actual  implementation  of substantial  fiscal
correction. There  is  no accurate  information  on fiscal  deficits  in 1987  yet,
but indications  are that  the deficit  has increased  substantially  beyond  what
it  was in 1986.  The  corrective  measures  necessary  for  the  base  case  scenario
to  be feasible  are  commensurately  larger.
Second,  the scenario  assumes  that the  bulk of the fiscal  correction
will come from current  expenditure,  subsidy  cuts or tax increases.  Public
sector  investment  was i.ssumed  constant  in real terms  in 1987,  and increasing
at slightly  below the  groiw.'th  rate of the  economy  attar  that  year (5 percent
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instead  of 6 percent).  If the fiscal  adjustment  comes from public sector
investment  in  addition  to the  small  decline  with respect  to GNP  assumed  here,
growth  performance  will  fall  short  of the  base  case  projections.
Third,  no further  real  depreciation  of the  exchange  rate  is projected
beyond  1988. Exports  are  predicted  to grow  at 7  percent  in  real  terms  in  this
case. 16 If instead  a policy  of real exchange  rate depreciation  would  be
followed, the debt-output  ratio would increase  faster  due to the capital
losses  incurred  after  a real  depreciation. 17
Fourth,  the  scenario  assumes  that  the foreign  financing  necessary  to
cover a current account deficit of 2.5 percent of GNP will indeed be
forthcoming. This will require  additional  financing,  since  Turkey  has just
entered a period of substantially  increased repayment obligations.  The
implicit  assumption  is  that  these  can  be refinanced,  and  that  additional  funds
will be available  to allow  a current  account  deficit  of 2.5  percent  of GNP.
Of course, in the current external environment it is conceivable  that
additional  funds  cannot  be raised. Section  IV.D(ii)  therefore  considers  what
will  happen  if this  additional  financing  will in  fact  not  materialize.
1j/  Output in Turkey's  trading  partners  is projected  at 3.5%.  This is an
export-weighted  average  of growth  rates  assumed  in the  World Development
Report  for the  OECD and the  Middle  East.  Econometric  evidence  presented
in Annex II shows an income  elasticity  of Turkish  exports  of about 2,
which  explains  the  7  percent  real  growth  rate  for  exports.
17  Of course,  by virtue of its design,  the debt-resource  ratio would not
increase  after  such  a policy. The  debt-export  ratio  would  decrease  enough
to exactly offset, at the weights chosen, the increasing  debt-output
ratio.
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(ii) What  Happens  to  Growth  if  Foreign  Financing  is  Cut  Back?
The results  are dramatically  different  if a cutback  in the current
account  deficit  is imposed. This alternative  assumes  a zero current  account
deficit throughout  the simulation  period. 18 The internal  adjustment  is
brought  about  by a matching  cut in public  sector  itnvestment.  The impact  on
output growth is severe:  by 1992, the growth  rate has fallen  by two full
percentage  points.  Output  growth  falls  by 1.5  percentage  points  on average
over  the  five  year  period.
Both  private  savings  and investment  fall  under  the impact  of slower
growth,  but savings  by much more than investment:  the latter  declines  by 0.5
percent  of GNP  at the  end  of the  simulation  period,  while  private  saving  falls
by 1.8  percentage  points  of GNP.  Net private  savings  therefore  declines  by
1.3 percent of GNP over the simulation  period.  This has further  adverse
effects  on fiscal  policy:  to still  maintain  external  balance,  a further  round
of fiscal  cutbacks  is  needed. By the  end  of the  period,  fiscal  deficits  need
to  be cut  back  by 4 percentage  points  of GNP instead  of just  2.5,  the  initial
current  account  cutback.  This is a vicious  circle  many high-debt  countries
that  follow  such  orthodox  policies  encounter. Fiscal  retrenchment  to achieve
.x'ernal  balance  causes  a slump  at home,  which  necessitates  more of the  same
measures  that  triggered  the  slump  to begin with.  By  the time this
destabilizing  process  has  worked  itself  out,  output  growth  has declined  a  full
2  percentage  points  per  year.
I2/ The current account deficit concept used includes  caly real interest
payments;  a zero  current  account  deficit  thus  corresponds  to  a deficit  at
positive  world  inflation  rates  and  positive  foreign  debt. World  inflation
is the  rate  of change  in the  dollar-based  foreign  price  index  used in  the
real  exchange  rate  calculations.
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The "stabilization  program" does yield benefits on the external
account.  The debt-output  ratio falls,  although  by less than the cumulative
current account  cutback:  8.9 percentage  points of GNP versus  a cumulative
current account improvement  of 12.7 percentage  points.  The almost four
percentage  points  shortfall  is  due  to the  slowdown  in  output  growth: the  fall
in  output  growth  reduces  the  beneficial  effects  of the  current  account  cutback
on the  debt-output  ratio  by almost  a third.
A second  mode  of response  would  be for  the  public  sector  to  shift  the
burden  of adjustment  to the private  sector. It could  do so by covering  the
external transfer through increased  issue of internal  debt instead  of by
adjusting  its fiscal  deficit.  This would create  a situation  that is very
similar  to the  second  debt-substitution  scenario  discussed  in Section  IV.C(i).
The outcome  would  be an almost  six  percentage  point  increase  in real  interest
rates, which  the government would have to match when  issuing its own
securities. This  would  rapidly  deteriorate  the  fiscal  situation  even  without
much further  debt issue  because  of rising  interest  payments  on existing  debt.
The analysis  in Section  IV.C(i)  demonstrated  that  the  resulting  deficit  would
be too large for financing through  monetization.  However debt issue  at
interest  rates  so far  above  the  real  growth  rate  of the  economy  would  lead  to
rapid  escalation  of debt  service  obligations.
This scenario  is in many ways the worst case scenario:  no external
funds forthcoming,  and a failure of the public sector  to adjust  to this
situation. Macroeconomic  stability  would  be in doubt  in such  circumstances.
It is by no means a likely scenario,  but serves a useful purpose.  It
demonstrates  the need for additional  foreign  financing,  coupled  with fiscal
policy adjustments to restore consistency  with a growth-oriented  debt
strategy.  The alternatives  are either  a slowdown  in output growth  if the
public sector does adjust to reduced  external  financing,  or macroeconomic
instability  if it  does  not.
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V.  CONCLUSIONS
To summarize  the results  of this analysis,  external  restraint  comes
at a high cost  in terms  of lost  output  growth. This  will  happen  in a direct
manner  if  the  internal  adjustment  relies  on  a cut  in  public  sector  investment.
Cuts in public  sector  consumption,  in addition  to  what is already  assumed  in
the  base  case,  are  probably  no longer  really  possible  on  a large  scale,  public
sector  savings  has already  increased  a great  deal over the last few years.
Alternatively, if the government relies on debt  issue, private sector
investment  would  fall  substantially  because  of the  necessity  to  raise  interest
rates. In  addition,  the  interest  rate  would  have  to rise  to levels  that  would
make further  internal  debt issue  highly  destabilizing.  The conclusion  should
be clear.  The secondary  market quotation  of Turkey's  debt suggests  that
external  debt is not threatening  Turkey's  creditworthiness  at current  levels
and anticipated future increases Internal adjustment is necessary for
consistency  with inflation  targets,  but  pushing  for  tighter  external  policies
seems both unnecessary  and potentially  highly damaging  to Turkey's  growth
prospects  and  internal  balance.
The model simulations  developed  and presented  here are illustrative
of the trade-offs involved  under structural  adjustment.  Undoubtedly,  the
financing  needs  commensurate  with larger  public  sector  deficits  generated  high
medium  term inflation  and real  interest  rates. But  the  thrust  of the  program
was growth-oriented  centering  around  export  performance  and the ability  to
keep savings  and investment  rates  up.  Fiscal  policy  played  a key  role  in the
process through an increase  in a well-directed  public expenditure  program
which  supported  the private  sector  through necessazy  infrastructure
investments  and special  incentives  and credit  for export  and investment.  A
key factor,  of course  was the substantial  excess  capacity  inherited  from  the
heavy  investments  made in the  1970's  which  allowed  for  a quick  improvement  in
output  and  exports  once  the  exchange  rate  was  aligned.
ChhibberDi&k/chhibb*r-Turk*y  Paper/ac  :07-28-88:  c-48-
Anand,  R. and  S.van  Wijnbergen  (1987),  "Inflatic-  --d  the  Financing  of
Government  Expenditure  in  Turkey:  an EmpirikL-  Analysis",  mimeo,  World
Bank.
Anand,  R. and  S.van  Wijnbergen  (1988),  "Export  Incentives,  Exchange  Rate
Policy  and  Export  Growth  in  Turkey",  in  process,  World  Bank.
Anand,  R.,  A.Chhibber,  R.Rocha  and  S.van  Wijnbergen  (1988),  "External  Debt,
Fiscal  Policy  and  Sustainable Growth  In Turkey: an Empirical
Analysis",  mimeo,  World  Bank.
Bean,  C.(  1984),  "The  Estimation  of "Surprise"  Models  and the  "Surprise"
Consumption  Function",  forthcoming,  Review  of EconQmic  Studies.
Celasun,  M. and  D.  Rodrik  (1987),***,  Forthcoming,  NBER  and  University  of
Chicago  Press
Chhibber,  A. and  S.  van  Wijnbergen  (1988): "Public  Policy  and  Private
Investment  in  Turkey",  mimeo,  World  Bank.
Cohen,  D., (1985),  "How  to  evaluate  the  Solvency  of an Indebted  Nation",
Economic  Policy,  vol.I.
Cohen,  D. (1987),  "External  and  Domestic  Debt  Constraints  of  LDCs:  a Theory
with Numerical Applications to Brazil and Mexico", World  Bank
Quarterly  Economic  Review.
S.van  Wijnbergen,  R. Anand  and  R. Rocha  (1988),"Inflation,  External  Debt
and Financial Sector Reform in Turkey: a Quantitative  Approach  to
consistent  Fiscal  Policy",  mimeo,  World  Bank.
ChhibberDisk/chhibber-Turkey  Paperlac:07-28-88:  1c-47-
V.  CONCLUSIONS
To summarize  the results  of this  analysis,  external  restraint  comes
at a high cost in terms  of lost  output  growth. This  will  happen  in a direct
manner  if the  internal  adjustment  relies  on a cut  in  public  sector  investment.
Cuts in public  sector  consumption,  in addition  to what is already  assumed  in
the  base  case,  are  probably  no longer  really  possible  on a large  scale,  public
sector  savings  has already  increased  a great  deal over the last few years.
Alternatively, if the government relies on debt issue, private sector
investment  would  fall  substantially  because  of the  necessity  to  raise  interest
rates. In  addition,  the  interest  rate  would  have  to rise  to levels  that  would
make further  internal  debt issue  highly  destabilizing.  The conclusion  should
be clear.  The secondary  market  quotation  of Turkey's  debt suggests  that
external  debt is not threatening  Turkey's  creditworthiness  at current  levels
and anticipated future increases Internal adjustment is necessary for
consistency  with inflation  targets,  but pushing  for tighter  external  policies
seems both unnecessary  and potentially  highly damaging  to Turkey's  growth
prospects  ond internal  balance.
The model simulations  developed  and presented  here are illustrative
of the trade-offs  involved  under structural  adjustment.  Undoubtedly,  the
financing  needs  commensurate  with larger  public  sector  deficits  generated  high
medium  term  inflation  and  real interest  rates. But  the  thrust  of the  program
was growth-oriented  centering  around  export  performance  and the ability  to
keep savings  and  investment  rates  up.  Fiscal  policy  played  a key  role  in  the
process through an increase  in a well-directed  public  expenditure  program
which  supported  the  private  sector  through necessary  infrastructure
investments  and special  incentives  and credit  for export  and investment. A
key factor,  of course  was  the  substantial  excess  capacity  inherited  from  the
heavy investments  made in  the  1970's  which  allowed  for  a quick  improvement  in
output  and  exports  once  the  exchange  rate  was  aligned.
ChhLbberDisk/cbhibber-Turkey  Paper/  c:07-28-88:  c-48-
Anand,  R. and  S.van  Wijnbergen  (1987),  "Inflation  and  the  Financing  of
Government  Expenditure  in  Turkey:  an Empirical  Analysis",  mimeo,  World
Bank.
Anand,  R. and  S.van  Wijr;bergen  (1988),  "Export  Incentives,  Exchange  Rate
Policy  and  Export  Growth  in  Turkey",  in  process,  World  Bank.
Anand,  R.,  A.Chhibber,  R.Rocha  and  S.van  Wijnbergen  (1988),  "External  Debt,
Fiscal  Policy  and  Sustainable Growth  in Turkey: an Empirical
Analysis",  mimeo,  World  Bank.
Bean,  C.( 1984),  "The  Estimation  of "Surprise"  Models  and  the  "Surprise"
Consumption  Function",  forthcoming,  Review  of EconQmic  Studies.
Celasun,  M. and  D. Rodrik  (;987),***,  Forthcoming,  NBER  and  University  of
Chicago  Press
Chhibber,  A. and  S.  van  Wijnbergen  (1988): "Public  Policy  and  Private
Investment  in  Turkey",  mimeo,  World  Bank.
Cohen,  D., (1985),  "How  to  evaluate  the  Solvency  of an Indebted  Nation",
Economic  Policy,  vol.I.
Cohen,  D. (1987),  "External  and  Domestic  Debt  Constraints  of LDCs:  a  Theory
with Numerical Applications to Brazil and Mexico", World  Bank
Quarterly  Economic  Review.
S.van  Wijnbergen,  R. Anand  and  R. Rocha  (1988),"Inflation,  External  Debt
and Financial Sector Reform in Turkey:  a Quantitative  Approach  to
consistent  Fiscal  Policy",  mimeo,  World  Bank.
ChhibberDisk/chhibber-Turkey  Papr/ac  :07-28-88:  lcPPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS65  Interaction  of Infant  Mortality  and
Fertility  and  the  Effectiveness  of
Health  and  Family  Planning  Programs  Howard  Barnum  July  1988  S.  Ainsworth
31091
WPS66  Slowing  the  Stork: Better  Health  for
Women  through  Family  Planning  Anthony  R.  Measham  July  1988  A.  Manciano
Roger  W.  Rochat  33226
WPS67  Price  and  Tax  Policy  for  Semi-
Subsistence  Agriculture  In  Ethiopia  Robert  D.  Weaver  August  1988  D.  Gustafson
Saad  All  Shire  33714
WPS68  A  Comparison  of Lamps  for  Domestic
Lighting  In  Developing  Countries  Robert  van  der  Plas
WPSS9  Does  Local  Financing  Make  Public
Primary  Schools  More  Efficient?
The  Philippine  Case  Emmanual  Jimenez  August  1988  T.  Hawkins
Vicente  Paqueo  33678
Ma. Lourdes  de  Vera
WPS70  Vocational  Education  and  Economic
Environments:  Conflict  or
Convergence?  Arvil  V.  Adams  August  1988  T.  Hawkins
Antoine  Schwartz  33678
WPS71  School  Effects  on  Student  Achievement
in  Nigeria  and  Swaziland  Marlaine  Lockheed  August  1988  T.  Hawkins
Andre  Komenan  33678
WPS72  The  Relative  Efficiency  of Public
Schools  in  Developing  Countries  Emmanuel  Jimenez  August  1988  T. Hawkins
Marlaine  Lockheed  33678
Vicente  Paqueo
WPS73  Taxation  and  Output  Growth  in  Africa  Jonathan  Skinner  August  1988  A. Bhalla
60359
WPS74  Fiscal  Stabilization  and  Exchange  Rate
Instability:  A  Theoretical  Approach
and  Some  Policy  Conclusions  Using
Mexican  Data  Andrew  Feltenstein  August  1988  A.  Bhalla
Stephen  Morris  60359
WPS75  Welfare  Dominance  and  the  Design  of
Excise  Taxation  in  the  Cote  d'lvoire  Shlomo  Yitzhaki  August  1988  A.  Bhalla
Wayne  Thirsk  60359PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS76  On  the  Shadow  Price  of a  Tax
Inspector  Shlomo  Yitzhaki
Yitzhak  Vakneen
WPS77  Incentive  Policies  and  Agricultural
Performance  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Bela  Balassa  August  1988  N. Campbell
33769
WPS78  Economists,  Institutions  and  Trade
Restrictions:  A  Review  Article  J.  Michael  Finger  September  1988  N. Artis
33731
WPS79  Quantitative  Appraisal  of
Adjustment  Lending  Bela  Balassa  August  1988  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS80  Emerging  Issues  of  Privatization
and  the  Public  Sector  Samuel  Paul  September  1988  E.  Madrona
61711
WPS81  Reaching  People  at  the  Periphery:
Can  the  World  Bank's  Population,
Health,  and  Nutrition  Operations
Do  Better?  Richard  Heaver  September  1988  S. Ainsworth
31091
WPS82  Microeconomic  Theory  of the  House-
hold  and  Nutrition  Programs  Dov  Chernichovsky  September  1988  S.  Ainsworth
Linda  Zangwill  31091
WPS83  Welfare  Costs  of  U.S.  Quotas  in
Textiles,  Steel,  and  Autos  Jaime  de  Melo  September  1988  C.  Cabana
David  Tarr  61539
WPS84  Black  Markets  for  Foreign  Exchange,
Real  Exchange  Rates  and Inflation:
Overnight  vs.  Gradual  Reform  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa  Brian  Pinto  September  1988  S. Fallon
61680
WPS85  Wage  Responsiveness  and Labor  Market
Disequilibrium  Ramon  E.  Lopez  September  1988  L.  Riveros
Luis  A. Riveros  61762
WPS86  External  Balance,  Fiscal  Policy  and
Growth  in  Turkey  Ritu  Anand  September  1988  A.  Chhibber
Ajay  Chhibber  60102
Sweder  van  Wijnbergen